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Abstract
In this paper we look at the relative information content of cash and futures prices for Canadian
Government bonds.
We follow the information-share approaches introduced by Hasbrouck (1995) and Harris et al
(1995), applying the techniques in Gonzalo-Granger (1995), to evaluate the relative contributions
of trading in the cash and futures markets to the price discovery process. Both approaches
estimate a vector error correction model that permits the separation of long-run price movements
from short-run market microstructure effects. As well, we follow Yan and Zivot (2004) who
introduce size measures of a market’s adjustment to a new equilibrium during the price discovery
process. We ﬁnd that, on an average day, just over 70% of price discovery occurs on the futures
market where bid-ask spreads are lower and trading activity is higher. The size of the responses to
shocks and the time taken to adjust to a new equilibrium are found to be signiﬁcantly larger for the
cash market.
JEL classiﬁcation: G12, G13, G14
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial markets; Market structure and pricing
Résumé
Les auteurs examinent les contenus informatifs respectifs des prix au comptant et à terme des
obligations du gouvernement canadien.
Pour évaluer les contributions respectives des marchés au comptant et à terme au processus de
découverte des prix, Chung, Campbell et Hendry recourent aux méthodes élaborées par
Hasbrouck (1995) et par Harris et autres (1995), ces derniers s’inspirant des techniques
qu’utilisent Gonzalo et Granger (1995). Les deux méthodes sont appliquées à un modèle vectoriel
à corrections d’erreurs qui permet de distinguer les mouvements de prix à long terme des effets à
court terme liés à la microstructure des marchés. En outre, dans l’esprit des travaux de Yan et
Zivot (2004), les auteurs mesurent l’ampleur des déviations que le marché enregistre par rapport
aux nouvelles valeurs d’équilibre durant le processus de découverte des prix. Ils constatent qu’au
cours d’une journée ordinaire, le marché à terme, sur lequel les écarts acheteur-vendeur sont plus
bas et l’activité est plus grande, contribue à hauteur d’un peu plus de 70 % à la découverte des
prix. L’ampleur des réactions aux chocs et la vitesse de retour à l’équilibre sont nettement plus
élevées sur le marché au comptant.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G12, G13, G14
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés ﬁnanciers; Structure de marché et ﬁxation des prix  3
1.  Introduction 
 
This paper is a first look at some new Canadian fixed-income data. In 2000, futures contracts on 
10-year Government of Canada bonds began to be traded on an electronic platform at the 
Montreal Exchange. When combined with data from the OTC cash market data reflecting 
transactions in the inter-dealer market covered by CanPx, this represents a truly rich and unique 
data set that can be used to investigate price discovery in two markets that are very important to 
the Canadian financial system. It is important to have an understanding of the characteristics of 
the price discovery process to identify any possible inefficiencies that exist. 
 
With regard to the econometric methodology employed, we follow two methodologies for 
calculating a market’s contribution to the price discovery process. The first technique for 
computing information shares was introduced by Hasbrouck (1995) while the second was 
contributed by Harris et al (1995), applying the techniques in Gonzalo-Granger (1995). Each 
technique is used to evaluate the contributions of trading in the cash and futures markets for 
government debt to the price discovery process. Both approaches work in a vector error 
correction model that permits the separation of long-run price movements from short-run market 
microstructure effects. As well, we determine size and temporal measures of market adjustment 
to equilibrium during the price discovery process based on a methodology introduced by Yan 
and Zivot (2004).  
 
There are several contributions in this paper. The first is that this is the first study to compute 
measures of price discovery across multiple markets using Canadian fixed-income data. Little 
has been done to examine price discovery in bond markets in comparison to a large literature that 
has compared price discovery across various equity markets. Another contribution of the paper is 
that alternative estimation techniques are employed in an attempt to account for some important 
heteroskedasticity that exists in the data. A GARCH model with intra-day seasonal effects and 
another model that uses only data from the beginning of the day are fit to the data and also used 
to compute information shares as part of a robustness check of the results. The third important 
contribution of the paper is that information shares are computed on a daily basis and then 
related to characteristics of the markets to show and explain how price discovery changes over   4
time. Finally, bootstrap confidence bands are generated for all of the information shares and 
impulse response statistics to lend added support to the conclusions. 
 
The various estimates reveal that about 70% of price discovery occurs on the futures market for 
the ten-year Government of Canada bond. The CGB market is an electronic exchange-traded 
customer market with lower bid/ask spreads than the inter-dealer voice-brokered spot market, 
which is found to be an important determinant of the day-to-day movements in the information 
share. Using the alternative GARCH model to account for some of the heteroskedasticity that is 
present yields an only slightly smaller estimate of the information share of the futures market. 
Measures of the cumulative deviation of each market following a shock and the amount of time it 
took to respond to a shock showed that the spot market took significantly longer to adjust to a 
new fundamental price. In sum, significantly more price discovery occurs via the futures market 
for the ten-year Government of Canada bond than through the spot market. This result is in line 
with observations in other bond and equity markets. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. We present a brief review of the antecedent literature on price 
discovery in section one. Section two introduces the two markets considered in this study. 
Features of the underlying cash market, at least as revealed via inter-dealer transactions covered 
by CanPx, are presented first. We then turn to a brief overview of the origin of the CGB market 
and its development since its inception in 1989, and subsequently consider some comparative 
summary statistics for these two markets for the contracts studied in this paper. In this section, 
we take particular care to describe how the transaction data have been filtered for use in the 
empirical analysis that follows. Section three surveys the econometric methodology employed in 
the paper. Section four presents the central empirical results of the paper. Here we begin with 
some descriptive statistics. Then price discovery measures are determined and compared for our 
two markets. The section also presents impulse-response comparisons for the two markets. 
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2.  Related Literature 
 
Price discovery refers to the process through which financial markets converge on the efficient 
price of the underlying asset. Theoretically when two similar markets for the same product are 
faced with the same information arriving simultaneously, then the two markets should react at 
the same time in a similar fashion. When the two markets do not react at the same time, one 
market will then lead the other. When such a lead-lag relation appears, the leading market is 
viewed as contributing a price discovery function for that instrument. Price discovery has been 
and continues to be an active field of research. The following researchers have looked at this 
question using a number of different cash and futures markets; in particular, Garbade and Silber 
(1982) looked at commodity futures, Stoll and Whaley (1990), Chan (1992) examined U.S. stock 
index futures, Grunbichler, Longstaff, and Schwartz (1994) studied German stock index futures, 
Poskitt (1999) has studied New Zealand interest rate futures, and Upper and Werner (2002) 
examined German Bund Markets. 
 
The general consensus in the price discovery literature is that the futures markets tend to lead the 
cash markets, with the main reason advanced being the relatively lower transaction costs in the 
futures markets. The trading cost hypothesis of price leadership has emerged that predicts that 
the market with the lowest overall trading cost will react most quickly to new information (see 
Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley, 1996). More recently, some studies have attempted to account for 
the differences in transaction costs and still show that the derivative markets tend to lead cash 
markets. There are some instances where the opposite relationship was found, Stephen and 
Whaley (1990), who examine the price discovery relationship between options and stocks traded 
on the NYSE. Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1993) confirm these findings.  
 
However, there are a number of factors involved in the measurement of the lead-lag relationship 
which can bias the results. In particular, Garbade and Silber (1982) point out that the time of day 
when prices are surveyed can have an effect on the lead time one market has over the other. It 
appears that market spreads exhibit a u-shaped pattern throughout the day with spreads the 
widest at the opening and closing of trading. In that paper, the authors analyze the relationship 
between the futures markets for a number of commodities and a cash equivalent price which is   6
determined by removing the cost of carry from the observed future price. Once this cash 
equivalent price has been determined, a supply/demand schedule for both markets is developed. 
From this model, a measure of the importance of price discovery in the futures market relative to 
the cash market is computed. Garbade and Silber show that while futures markets dominate cash 
markets, cash prices do not merely echo future prices, there are reverse information flows from 
cash to future markets as well. 
 
Using an ARMA framework, Grunbichler, Longstaff, and Schwartz (1994) show that, when the 
underlying is floor traded and the future is electronically screen traded, futures prices lead spot 
prices by as much as 20 minutes. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that electronic 
screen trading accelerates the price discovery process. Tests using squared returns, to allow for a 
greater weight for large trades, also have similar results.  
 
An important implication of the lead-lag relationship is that informed traders can act on their 
private information more rapidly and at a lower cost in the futures market than in the spot market 
(see Stoll and Whaley, 1990, Stephan and Whaley, 1990). Future markets also provide greater 
immediacy. If trading costs are lower, informed traders may find it possible to trade on the basis 
of less significant information. The effect would be to accelerate the price discovery in the 
futures market (Grossman and Miller, 1988).  
 
As we have suggested, a number of different methodologies have been used to determine the 
time difference in the lead-lag relationship. In this paper, we will focus on the information share 
methodologies of Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995). Hasbrouck (1995) makes 
the assumption of an efficient price common to both the futures and cash market and 
characterizes a market’s contribution to price discovery as its information share defined as the 
proportion of the efficient price variation that can attributed to that market. Hasbrouck has 
argued that the appropriate econometric context for the analysis is supplied by the vector error 
correction model (VECM) (Stock and Watson, 1988). Another approach is supplied by the 
identification of long-memory common factors suggested by Granger and Gonzalo (1995). The 
relative merits of the two approaches are the subject of some discussion; a special issue of the 
Journal of Financial Markets (2002) is devoted to the topic.   7
 
Harris, McInish, Shoesmith, and Wood (1995) build a VECM of transaction price data on IBM 
stock prices across three spot markets. Prices are cointegrated across the three markets. By 
examining Granger causality tests and the size of the coefficients on the error correction term, 
they conclude that price adjustment occurs on all three markets in order to maintain cross-market 
equilibrium. Poskitt (1999) uses a similar framework to examine the sources of price discovery 
in cash and futures markets for short-term interest rate contracts in New Zealand. The futures 
market is once again found to dominate the price discovery process even though it is a 
comparatively small-sized market. 
 
Harris, McInish, and Wood (2002) expands on their earlier work using a Gonzalo and Granger 
(1995) framework to analyze the common factor weights attributable to three informationally-
linked stock exchanges for 23 individual Dow stocks. They confirm Hasbrouck’s (1995) results 
that the NYSE is informationally dominant in discovering the efficient price of the stock. They 
do, however, discover time variation in the share of price discovery attributed to the NYSE and 
explain this with a negative relationship between the price discovery share and spreads on the 
markets. The market with the lower spreads or transaction costs tends to dominate the price 
discovery process. We complete a similar sort of analysis by comparing daily information shares 
to relative spreads and trading activity in the two markets. 
 
Another series of papers compare price discovery across stock market index futures and cash 
markets. Hasbrouck (2003) finds that for, the S&P 500 and Nasdaq-100 indexes, price discovery 
was dominated by the electronically-traded futures contracts. Kim, Szakmary, and Schwarz 
(1999) test the transaction costs hypothesis across U.S. stock index futures markets and find that, 
because of its lower transactions costs, the S&P index futures market dominates price discovery 
among equity futures markets. Booth, So, and Tse (1999) examine price discovery for the 
German stock index, index futures, and index options. They find that price discovery was 
dominated by the spot index and the index futures and that index options contributed relatively 
little. 
   8
A recent paper examining price discovery across markets by Yan and Zivot (2004) assesses the 
efficiency of price discovery by the magnitude of pricing errors given by impulse response 
functions measuring the reaction to a permanent shock to the efficient price. Permanent and 
transitory innovations to the prices are identified with a structural model. Their methodology is 
similar in spirit to Hasbrouck (2003) but takes it a step further to numerically measure deviations 
from the efficient price. They apply their methodology to the case of price discovery for the 
JPY/EUR exchange rate by comparing the prices in the direct trading market to the markets for 
indirect implied trading via USD/EUR and JPY/USD. They find that substantial price discovery 
occurs through the USD markets due to the much greater degree of liquidity available in these 
markets. The relative liquidity and lower transaction costs of the USD markets are conducive to 
the efficient assimilation of dispersed economy-wide information. 
 
Upper and Wener (2002) is very much in the spirit of our contribution. They examine price 
discovery between the German Bund futures and spot markets during 1998. They find that 
between 67% and 81% (using the Hasbrouck methodology) or about 83% (using the Gonzalo-
Granger methodology) of price discovery occurred in the futures market during the relatively 
normal times of the first half of 1998. However, during some of the more volatile periods in the 
second half of 1998, particularly around the time of the LTCM crisis, the share of price 
discovery of the spot market fell to near zero. They claim this is consistent with anecdotal 
evidence they have that, during stress periods, spot trading simply follows the futures markets. 
 
Finally, a recent addition to the literature is Mizrach and Neely (2005), who use the Hasbrouck 
and Granger-Gonzalo information shares to investigate bivariate price discovery across different 
cash and futures markets for bonds of different maturities. An innovation in their paper is the 
study of price discovery in a system of futures and cash bond prices of different maturities. They 
found that, using just the 10 year bond data, the cash market dominated price discovery from 
1995 to 1999. However, in 2000 the cash market information share dropped significantly, 
because GovPx was no longer representative of the inter-dealer broker market with the advent of 
new electronic platforms, and the futures market began to dominate price discovery. In the full 
specification combining different maturities, it was found that trading in the 5-year-bond cash 
market and the 30-year-bond futures market dominated price discovery.   9
 
We conclude this review of previous work on price discovery with the observation that ours is 
the first paper to investigate the price discovery process between the spot and futures market for 
the Government of Canada 10 year bond. This is a particularly interesting exercise given the 
electronic trading of the futures contact for this bond is relatively new but still exhibits a high 




3.  The CGB and the Ten-Year Government of Canada Bond Market 
 
The source for the spot market data for the Government of Canada 10-year bond is Moneyline 
Telerate’s CanPX system.
1 CanPX is a data service that consolidates and disseminates trade and 
quotation data submitted by Canada’s fixed-income IDBs.  Over the sample period, the four 
Canadian IDBs are Freedom International Brokerage Company, Prebon Yamane (Canada) Ltd., 
Shorcan Brokers Limited, and Tullett Liberty (Canada) Ltd. CanPX was introduced by the IDBs 
and securities dealers on August 20, 2001 with a view to enhancing the degree of transparency in 
the Government bond market. Although in operation since 2001, there are two large breaks in the 
sample, from September 2001 to February 2002 and from March to September 2003. The sample 
used for this paper covers the period from February 26, 2002 to February 25, 2003 and 
November 27, 2003 to February 27, 2004. 
 
During the sample period under study, the IDBs operated as voice brokers with posted quotes 
representing firm commitments to trade at the specified price. The volume, however, can be 
‘worked up’ through negotiations between the buyer and seller once a trade is initiated. The 
CanPX data amalgamates all the trade and quote data presented on the screens of the four IDBs 
from approximately 0700 to 1800 each day. Only the best bid and offer quotes from across the 
four IDBs are presented to CanPX customers and stored. Each line in the source data is a 
“snapshot” of the information on the CanPX screens for a particular security at a given time. A 
line of data is saved for each security every time there is a change anywhere on the CanPX 
                                                 
1 Further information on the CanPx data can also be found in D’Souza, Gaa and Yang (2003).   10
screen so there is a significant amount of duplicate information. The data also contains some data 
entry errors that were filtered prior to use. In particular, while the IDB quotes are firm, there can 
be coding errors by the dealers for which they are not held accountable. For example, if a price is 
entered as 110 when it should have been 101, the dealer is only held to the cents and not the 
dollars. These errors are short-lived, quite obvious, and so were corrected. There were a few 
other significant data anomalies that could not be explained or corrected so these days were 
dropped from the estimation. In addition, there were a few periods of CanPX inactivity probably 
explained by occasional down times in their system. Any day with a period exceeding two hours 
with no price changes, while the futures market was still adjusting, was also excluded. 
 
Only pricing and trading data for the benchmark bond in the cash market is used. The benchmark 
bond is defined as the most actively traded bond and switches from the old benchmark to a new 
bond once trading in the newer bond exceeds the old benchmark. In Canada, the ten-year 
benchmark is built up over time through re-openings of auctions for the same bond. Therefore, 
unlike the U.S., a bond does not become the new benchmark immediately after its first auction 
but only after it has reached some critical size and is accepted as the new benchmark by the 
market. 
 
Data from the Investment Dealers Association show that roughly 55% of the Canadian secondary 
spot market was customer-dealer trade in 2002, while 45% was inter-dealer trading. Of the inter-
dealer trading, 86% was through IDBs with the remainder being direct dealer to dealer trade. The 
CanPX data is relatively complete in that it records the best bid and offer quotes and all trades 
from all four of the Canadian IDBs. The CanPX data set, however, does not include data for the 
Canadian IDB “roll” market in which dealers trade one security for another on a spread basis. 
This is potentially an important part of the inter-dealer bond market but is believed to be more 
significant for treasury bills than for bonds. 
 
In September 1989, the Montreal Exchange introduced a futures contract on the Ten-Year 
Government of Canada Bond to trade under the ticker symbol CGB.
2 This is a customer market 
with no market maker. At any given time there are up to eight contracts available for trading 
                                                 
2 More details on the CGB market and its characteristics can be found in Campbell and Chung (2003).   11
corresponding to four maturity dates per year over two years. The vast majority of trading 
volume takes place on the front-month contract. Trading in the next-to-deliver contract usually 
increases only after the first notice day for the currently traded contract. In this study, as in 
others, we have rolled over contract maturities when volume on the next to deliver contract 
surpasses the volume on the front month contract. 
 
From the inception of the security until 2003 there appear to have been three distinct sub-periods 
in the trading history of the CGB. Until 1994 or so, the number of monthly contracts hovered 
about 50,000. Throughout the second half of the nineties the monthly figure hovered around the 
100,000 figure, while in the more recent period the numbered climbed to 250,000.  However, 
even with such growth the CGB trails a number of competing products from other exchanges 
including the Eurobund, the U.S. Ten-Year Treasury Note future and the Long Gilt.  The size of 
these markets relative to that for the CGB is considerable: the market volume of the Ten-Year 
Treasury Note futures is some 70 times larger, the Eurobund is again twice as large. 
 
In September 2000, the Montreal Exchange moved from a traditional open outcry system to an 
automated electronic system, known as the Montreal Automated System (SAM). The move 
toward an electronic system follows a trend involving many of the other future exchanges around 
the world, particularly in Europe with both EUREX and LIFFE exchanges adopting an electronic 
platform. In Montreal, SAM represents the electronic order book where all orders submitted for 
trading are registered and matched. Intraday transactions for the CGB are available since October 
22, 2001. This study only considers data from the daily continuous trading session that runs from 
8:05 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., with three separate phases within this period. The first phase is the pre-
opening phase from 8:05 a.m. to 8:18 a.m. when offers can be placed as well as cancelled. The 
second phase is the no cancel-phase from 8:18 a.m. to 8:20 a.m. during which orders can no 
longer be cancelled. The third phase covers the open continuous trading from 8:20 a.m. to 3:00 
p.m. The data used in what follows is taken only from the no-cancel phase and the open 
continuous phase. In this data set, a recorded quote represents the best bid/offer spread at the 
time of recording and is maintained until a subsequent quote is entered.
3  
                                                 
3 The following fields are included in the dataset: a date and time stamp to the second, ask quantity, ask price, bid 
price, bid quantity, bid size, trade size, and trade price.   12
 
Seven complete contracts fall within the purview of the study; in general, the trading days 
associated with a specific contract run until one to three days after the first notice of the contract. 
The cutoff is determined at the point where the volume for the next contract exceeds that of the 
current contract. More precisely, we examine the indicated trading days for each of the seven 
CGB contracts considered in this study: 
 
 
Contract     Trading Days      
June, 2002    February 26, 2002 – May 29, 2002    [58 trading days]   
September, 2002  May 30, 2002– August 28, 2002    [56 trading days] 
  December, 2002  August 29, 2002 – November 26, 2002  [53 trading days] 
  March, 2003    November 27, 2002 – February 25, 2003  [56 trading days] 
  March, 2004    November 27, 2003 – February 25, 2004  [55 trading days]  
  June, 2004    February 26, 2004 – May 26, 2004    [60 trading days] 
  September, 2004  May 27, 2004 – August 25, 2004    [57 trading days] 
 
Once days with early pre-holiday closures are excluded, there are 395 complete trading days in 
the sample. Some days are missing observations at the beginning of the day because of a lack of 
activity in the cash market. These days are, however, still included in order to maximize the 




3.  Price Discovery Across Markets 
 
Both the Hasbrouck and Gonzalo-Granger (GG) approaches to price discovery feature a 
decomposition of price movements into a permanent, non-stationary component and a transitory 
component. Although ultimately related, the two approaches differ on how the permanent 
component is identified. Under the Hasbrouck approach, the permanent component is a 
martingale and accordingly reflects features of efficient market behaviour. By contrast, the non-
stationary component in the GG approach is not a martingale and may be forecastable. Our 
intention is not to pronounce on the relative merits of the two approaches. There appears to be   13
some consensus in the literature that both are useful. Here we outline the bare bones of the two 
approaches. For further details on these specifications, it should be noted that a recent issue of 
the Journal of Financial Markets (2002) assesses the two approaches in some detail. Yan and 
Zivot (2005) also supply a discussion and critique of these techniques. 
 
From our perspective of a futures and spot market, the point of departure is a bivariate price 
process pt given by the VECM that reflects the reality that the two prices are related via arbitrage 
considerations: 
 
(1)     ∑ + ∆ + + = ∆ − − j t j t j t t v p B Ap c p . 1    
 
Given the cointegrating vector (1, -1), since the difference between spot and futures prices 













A . The adjustment coefficients a1, 
a2  figure prominently in what follows. 
 
The Hasbrouck approach follows Stock and Watson (1988). After rewriting (1) in moving 
average form followed by some algebra, we determine an expression for the price level that has a 
permanent and transitory component: 
 
(2)     , ) (
~
) 1 ( 0 1 p v L C v C p t k
t
k t + + = ∑ =  
 
where C(L) gives the MA representation of the price difference process in (1) and  ) (
~
L C  is a lag 
polynomial constructed from C(L). C(1) has identical rows c = (c1, c2 ) in the bivariate case due 
to cointegration, and so the permanent contribution of the innovation vector vt  to the price is cvt  
with variance given by cVc￿, where V is the covariance matrix of v. If V is diagonal, the 
relative contributions of the individual markets to the overall variance can be isolated as: 
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If V is not diagonal, then Hasbrouck proposes a Choleski factorization of V that allows a similar 
decomposition yielding information shares similar to the above procedure. However, here the 
attribution of information depends on the ordering of the variables in the decomposition. Each 
ordering in fact yields a different information share Ij for each market j; the range so determined 
is said to give the Hasbrouck bounds for the information shares.  
 
It was established by Martens (1998) that the vector c can be determined from the A in the 
regression (1) and that this vector in turn is identical to the permanent component factors in the 
Gonzalo-Granger analysis discussed below. These factor weights are given by: 
 














=   . 
 
The Gonzalo-Granger approach views prices as determined as follows: 
 
(5)     t t t p f W p ~ + =   , 
 
with  f the non-stationary permanent component and  p ~  the stationary transitory component. 
Identification is achieved by imposing two conditions including one that stipulates that that f is a 
linear combination of the current prices p .The factor weights are given by (4). 
 
In short, the differences between the two approaches relate to the martingale feature of the 
Hasbrouck approach contrasted with the Gonzalo-Granger approach, and the fact that along with 
the weights associated with the error-correction adjustment the Hasbrouck approach also 
considers the variances of the underlying innovations. These points are emphasized in Baillie et 
al (2002).     
 
Note that, by construction, the Hasbrouck information shares are contained in the [0,1] interval. 
The GG shares in (4), however, are not bounded. To ensure that GG shares are in the [0,1] 
interval and hence have a more sensible interpretation, we impose the following restrictions on   15
the cointegrating vector loadings or adjustment coefficients: a1≤0 and a2≥0. With the variables 




The above models were also extended to allow for GARCH effects in the variances of each 
market’s price series. Tests using the base model reject the null of homoskedasticity for almost 
every specification and period investigated. In addition, an examination of simple plots of 
squared returns shows that there is a seasonal pattern to volatility over the day. This is similar to 
what is shown in many studies of volatility. There is evidence of increased volatility around 
8:30, 10:00, and 14:00. The first two are undoubtedly related to the timing of announcements for 
major data releases while the afternoon increase is likely a form of end-of-day effect even though 
it is an hour before close of trading in the futures market. Volatility around 8:30 is much larger 
than at the other two peaks and even more so above other periods during the day. Due to the 
computational difficulties of allowing for a seasonal pattern in a GARCH model, only the 
increased volatility for the 10 minutes following 8:30 will be modeled. To estimate the GARCH 
model, equation (1) is augmented by assuming the error term follows vt ~ N(0,Ht) where 
 
(6)     D S D B H B A v v A C C H t t t t t
'
1
' ' ' ' + + + = −   . 
 
This is the BEK specification of Engle and Kroner (1995) which directly imposes positive 
definiteness on the variance matrix. A, B, C, and D are parameter matrices and St is a seasonal 
dummy that is 1 for the 10 minutes following 8:30 a.m. and zero otherwise. The GARCH 
estimation will change the GG information shares only if it affects the error correction 
coefficients in equation (3).
5 The Hasbrouck shares in equation (4) will be affected both by any 
change in the error correction coefficients and the new estimate of the variance-covariance 
matrix Ht. We will use the asymptotic value of Ht to compute the Hasbrouck information shares 
as opposed to any in-sample average or individual Ht. 
 
                                                 
4 We found that the restrictions were only imposed on 14 of the 395 days and were only rejected for one of those 
days. 
5 Note that OLS coefficients are unbiased but inefficient in the face of heteroskedasticity, so that the OLS-based GG 
shares should, in theory, also be unbiased.    16
We also deal with the issue of higher opening volatility by presenting Gonzalo-Granger and 
Hasbrouck information shares computed directly for just the first 40 minutes of the trading day. 
For this specification, only days with a full sample from 8:20 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. were included. 
This reduced the sample only slightly to 385 from 395 days. 
 
Another manner in which price discovery has been studied recently is to examine the shape of 
the impulse response functions in each market following a shock. Hasbrouck (2003) performed 
visual inspections of the response functions to get a flavour for the speed of convergence across 
markets. Yan and Zivot (2004) formalized this methodology by computing the cumulative 
pricing errors during the price discovery process. Some preliminary technical remarks are in 
order. 
 
According to this approach, we first compute the cumulative difference between the impulse 
response value in each period and the value to which it converged in the long-run. Since 
structural shocks are identified via Choleski decompositions, it follows that there are four 
impulse responses for each of two decompositions (two variables responding to two shocks 
according to two decompositions). Within each decomposition, the cumulative sums are then 
weighted by the share of the asymptotic variance decomposition for that market and shock (i.e., 
the futures market response to a cash market shock is weighted by the contribution of the cash 
market to futures market volatility in the long run). In turn, each Choleski decomposition is 
equally weighted. The result is a cumulative pricing error. Higher values of the error imply 
slower convergence to the new long-run equilibrium value following a shock. In other words, 
slower price discovery in that market. In addition, we will also compute the average time taken 
to reach a new fundamental price level after a shock. A weighted average across all the possible 
shocks is computed in the same manner as described above. A price is said to have reached its 
new fundamental level after a shock when it is within 10% of that new level. 
 
Before proceeding to the empirical results there are two important issues to resolve. The first 
relates to the choice of the price variable. In this study, we use quotes, more particularly the mid-
point of the bid-ask spread, rather than transaction prices as the fundamental variable to be 
modeled with equation (1).  In the Canadian data we are analyzing, there is considerably more   17
price movement throughout the day with this choice and we were more comfortable as a result in 
making the second decision to sample the data at 30-second intervals. We preferred to sample at 
the highest frequency possible consistent with sufficient price movement such that it would not 
seem that prices in one market or the other were not moving. Therefore, there are 800 
observations per day from 8:20 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. The VECM model will be estimated daily and 
the results will report the mean, median, and the 25
th and 75
th percentiles across the information 




4. Price Discovery: Empirical Results 
 
We begin with a discussion of some basic descriptive statistics of activity in the spot and futures 
markets for 10-year Government debt in Canada before considering the estimation results for the 
VECM model of price discovery. Here we will consider in turn the statistical significance of the 
error correction terms, the implications of the Granger causality tests and, finally, the 
information shares themselves. 
 
Table 1 relates basic trading statistics for the spot and futures markets for the seven contracts in 
the paper. The CGB market saw the average daily number of trades increase from about 540 
trades for the June 2002 Contract to just over 950 trades in the September 2004 contract period. 
This represented a daily total volume increase from about 5250 contracts to 7300 contracts. The 
average daily trade size, however, fell from about 9.8 contracts to about 7.8 contracts. With a 
notional value of $100,000 per contract this implies an average trade size of less that $1 million 
and a total daily volume of over $700 million. In contrast, in the spot market during the period of 
the June 2002 contract there were only about 30 to 40 trades each day representing just over 
$160 million in total daily volume. The average daily trade size fell from about $4.7 million 
during the June 2002 Contract period to about $4.3 million during the September 2004 contract 
period. The inter-dealer spot market trading through IDBs has many fewer trades per day but 
                                                 
6 Estimating over longer periods is, of course, possible but would also require us to model the fact that the futures 
price will tend to mechanically converge toward the cash market price not because of price discovery but simply due 
to the futures contract getting closer to maturity.   18
each trade is much larger. The futures market is four to five times the size of the spot market 
considered here in terms of the value of daily volume traded. 
 
Trading costs are generally lower on futures markets than on spot markets. Summary statistics on 
the percentage quoted half spread given in Table 2.
7 Over the sample, the spread has fallen in the 
CGB market from about 2.42 basis points in the June 2002 Contract to 1.35 basis points in the 
September 2004 Contract. At the same time, the spot market spread fell from 3.60 to 2.89 basis 
points. Both markets experienced reduced trading costs over the sample but, in each case, the 
CGB spreads were smaller by about 30% or more. This represents a potentially substantial 
savings for traders and a strong expectation for more price discovery in the futures market than 
in the spot market.  
 
The spread data for the intra-day sub-samples reveal that CGB transaction costs increase steadily 
through the day while the spot market costs could increase or decrease. There was also much less 
change over the day in the spot market spreads than in the CGB spreads.  
 
It should be noted that the spot market trading statistics are biased down and the spread statistics 
biased upward by the fact that the markets are compared for the common period of 8:20 am to 
3:00 pm. The spot market is actually open from 7:00 am to 5:00 pm and there can be substantial 
activity during the periods when only the spot market is open. When looking at the statistics for 
the full spot market day, however, we see that there are more trades and smaller spreads than 
mentioned above, but that there is still greater activity and lower transaction costs on the CGB 
market. Further indicators of market liquidity (best and behind-best bid and ask depth, price 




Table 3 summarizes some of the daily estimation results. The table shows, for daily estimation 
periods, whether the coefficient was significant on the error correction term in the estimation of 
the futures or cash equations [equation (1)] and the results of a Granger Causality test proposed 
                                                 
7 The percentage quoted half spread is 1/2*[(Pask-Pbid)/(Pask+Pbid)/2]. 
8 See D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang (2003) for a discussion of various liquidity and order flow measures for the CanPx 
data.   19
by Sims that includes lagged dependent variables. In general, both error correction terms were 
statistically significant implying significant price discovery in each market. On only one day was 
the error correction term significant in the futures market but not the cash market. There were 
118 days with a significant coefficient in the spot equation but not the futures. The remainder 
had significance in both equations. These results give a strong indication of price discovery in 
both markets but more predominantly in the futures market because it is the cash market that 
adjusts most to the disequilibrium measured by the error correction term. 
 
Next, consider the Granger Causality results. There are only 9 days indicating that the cash 
market causes price movements in the futures market, while there are 226 days implying the 
reverse with the futures causing the cash. Another 124 days experienced bi-directional causality. 
Once again this is a strong indication that the futures market dominates price discovery for the 
10-year Government of Canada bond. 
 
We now turn to results for the Gonzalo-Granger and Hasbrouck information shares, which are 
reported in Table 4 for the CGB market. The cash market share is, of course, just one minus the 
CGB share. Three estimates of the information shares are considered: OLS over the full day, 
OLS over the first 40 minutes of trading, and a full-day estimate of a GARCH–based 
specification of the daily volatility patterns as described in the previous section. Information 
shares reported are daily averages over the life of the contract indicated. 
 
The three information shares show that more than half of the price discovery for the 10-year 
bond occurs on the CGB futures market. According to the OLS results over the entire day, the 
share for the futures market has risen from a minimum of 59% in Contract 1 to a high of 73% for 
Contract 5 according to the Granger-Gonzalo test and has remained close to 70% for all but the 
first contract. Indeed, the full sample estimate says that 69% of price discovery occurs in the 
futures market. The Hasbrouck measures track similar results. The Hasbrouck share has risen 
from a 63%-72% range in the first contract up to a range of 76%-86% for Contract 5 before 
falling back slightly. In general, the Hasbrouck information share tends to yield a fairly tight 
range around a midpoint that is slightly larger than the results for the Granger-Gonzalo share. 
The plots in Figure 1 give a flavour of the day-by-day movements on these shares for three of the   20
seven contracts: Contracts 1, 4, and 5.
9 We see the tight range for the Hasbrouck numbers 
throughout each contract and that the OLS results tend to fall slightly below that range. Some of 
the contracts, particularly contracts 1, 5, and 7, appear to have lower futures market information 
shares at the beginning of the contract but it is difficult to identify a similar pattern in the other 
contracts. What is visually notable is the high daily volatility across each contract. This feature is 
also evident in the results for the 25
th percentile, 75
th percentile, and standard deviation reported 
in Table 4. 
  
This variability of the information estimates across the contract is also reflected in the results for 
the two other estimation procedures. In one, we restricted the OLS estimation to the first 40 
minutes of trading from 8:20a.m to 9:00a.m. With this sample, the futures market information 
share was slightly lower at 62% for the GG technique and 61%-74% for the Hasbrouck share. 
However, the variability of these estimates across the seven contracts is much more pronounced, 
up to 60% larger than the full day estimates for some contracts. Figure 2 gives the daily plots for 
the three representative contracts. It is also evident here that this restricted estimation procedure 
leads to more variable estimates of information shares across each contract.     
 
By contrast, the GARCH estimates show significantly smaller information shares being 
attributed to the futures market for some contracts. Over the full sample, there is about a 10 
percentage point drop in the estimated GG information share. The Hasbrouck midpoint drops by 
a similar amount with the range shifting downwards and considerably widening. Correcting in 
this way for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the data and the intra-day variance pattern 
shows that the basic results may over-attribute price discovery to the futures market. However, 
the GARCH results are themselves quite variable occupying the middle ground in this regard 
between the full-day OLS estimates and the morning OLS estimates for the Gonzalo-Granger 
measure [see Figure 2] and the most variable for the Hasbrouck measure.  
 
To pursue this issue further we plot in Figure 3 the 95% bootstrap confidence bands of the OLS 
estimates and the GARCH estimates of the GG share. The confidence bands in these figures are 
                                                 
9 The results for these three contracts are representative of the characteristics of all seven. The plots for the other 
contracts are excluded in the interest of saving space and are available on request.   21
the 5
th and 95
th percentiles from 1000 bootstrap samples of the OLS specification for each day. 
The results imply a 90% confidence band of about +/- 0.15 (or from about 0.53 to 0.83) around 
each daily estimate. Returning to Figure 3, we see, that while more volatile, the GARCH 
estimates tend to fall within the OLS confidence bands. 
 
Bootstrap results presented in Table 5 confirm the basic conclusion of this section that well over 
half of price discovery occurs on the futures market.
10 Here we see that, over the full sample, the 
GG measure for the futures market is greater than 0.5 for almost 90% of the days while for 61% 
of days the bootstrap confidence interval for the information share is greater than 0.5. Similar 
results obtain for the mid-point of the Hasbrouck measures: for 86% of the days the share is 
greater than 0.5 while for 50% of the days the confidence interval for the mid-point surpasses 
0.5. Also note that there was a jump from 38% for Contract 1 to 61% for Contract 2 in the 
percentage of days with a GG estimate significantly greater than 0.5 (from 26% to 46% for the 
Hasbrouck lower bound over the same period). 
 
The next two tables present results in the spirit of Yan and Zivot (2004). Table 6 presents the 
cumulative difference between the impulse response in each period and the long-run value to 
which the price converged following the shock. Figure 4 plots the average of impulse responses 
across all of the days for both a futures and a cash market price shock. The cumulative deviation 
from the long-run value is computed for the first 1000 periods after the shock. From this example 
day’s results, we see that the cash market tends to deviate more and for longer than the futures 
market. For the OLS-day and GARCH estimates, the cumulative absolute deviation of the spot 
market from its equilibrium value is approximately two to three times (except for the first 
contract) larger than that experienced by the futures market. This result is a strong indication that 
the cash market exhibits a substantially slower rate of convergence and price discovery than does 
the futures market.  The difference is not as pronounced for the OLS-morning estimates. The 
bootstrap results in the table’s right panel confirm this conclusion concerning the superior 
efficiency of the futures market: over the entire sample, for 45% of the trading days (172 of 395 
                                                 
10 Only bootstrap results for the OLS estimates were generated. Bootstrap bands for the GARCH estimates were 
computationally infeasible to compute.   22
days), the cumulative difference is statistically higher for the cash market, while in only 3% of 
the days (11 of 395 days) is it statistically lower.  
 
From Table 7 we are able to draw the same conclusion from a somewhat different perspective in 
analyzing the impulse response functions for the two markets. Here we focus on the number of 
minutes it takes for the market to converge to its long-run equilibrium.
11 For example, the 
difference in convergence times between markets is about 4 minutes in favour of the futures 
market. This speedier pattern is seen in each of the contracts, ranging from three minutes in the 
first contract to six minutes in the fourth. As in the previous table, there does not appear to be a 
difference between the OLS-day results and the GARCH results in favouring the futures market. 
The difference between the futures and cash markets is not as pronounced for the estimates 
restricted to the opening trading period.  Interestingly though, the mean times for convergence 
following a shock are lower for the opening period than for either of the other estimates. This is 
somewhat surprising given this is the period during which the most important macro news 
announcements are released and hence is likely to have the greatest degree of uncertainty. The 
bootstrap confidence intervals underscore the point: in almost 50% of the days over the whole 
sample, the speed of convergence of the futures market is statistically superior to that of the cash 
market. 
 
5. Determinants of the Information Shares 
In this section, we regress information shares on various measures of trading costs and activity in 
an attempt to explain the daily variation. The average daily percentage bid-ask half spread is 
included to measure trading costs or liquidity. Wider spreads in the futures market should 
decrease that market’s information share while higher spreads in the spot market should increase 
it. Trading activity is measured by total daily number of trades. More trading in the futures 
market should raise its information share while greater trading in the spot market should decrease 
it. Liquidity and trading activity are included either for each market individually or as a ratio of 
the two markets. Also included in the regressions is a dummy variable equal to one if the day is 
                                                 
11 See Figure 4 for an example showing how the time until convergence was computed. The figure plots the average 
across all of the days for one ordering of the OLS-full day impulse responses. In the top panel, for a futures price 
shock, the futures market takes about four minutes while the cash market took about eight minutes to come within 
10% of the long-run value.   23
one of the first three of a contract and zero otherwise. This variable is to test the observation that 
information shares seem to be lower at the start of a contract. Finally, we include a dummy equal 
to one for Contracts 2 through 7 and zero for Contract 1 in order to test whether there was a 
significant increase in the futures market information share at that time. Table 8 gives the results 
for the daily GG and the midpoint of the Hasbrouck range for each of the three specifications: 
full-day OLS, opening OLS, and GARCH. 
 
The results show that the equation fits best for the full-day OLS estimates but quite poorly for 
the opening-period OLS sample. The fit for the GARCH estimates was in between the others. 
The pattern of signs and significance was the same for the full-day OLS and GARCH estimates 
and for both the GG and Hasbrouck midpoint information shares. We see that the first three days 
of a new contract have significantly lower futures market information share, that there was a 
significant increase in the share after Contract 1, that the spread variables are sensible with the 
own market spread reducing the futures information share but the cash market spread increasing 
the futures market information share, and that the number of trades in the cash market has a 
positive instead of the expected negative effect. When the spread and trade variables are 
expressed as a ratio of the two markets to account for collinearity, relatively higher spreads or 
trading costs in the futures market still decreases that market’s information share while relatively 
more trading in the futures market still has the anomalous result of also decreasing price 
discovery in the futures market. Evidently, the ratio of the number of trades in the two markets 
does not adequately capture the concept of relative depth or liquidity.  
 
In sum, daily information shares respond as expected to trading costs in the two markets. Higher 
spreads or trading costs in the futures (cash) market will lower (increase) the share of price 
discovery that occurs in that market. The effect of relative trading activity is significant but 





6. Conclusions and Future Research   24
 
After considerable analysis we can conclude that around 70% of price discovery occurs on the 
futures market through trading of the CGB contract, notwithstanding its relatively recent arrival 
in the Canadian market. Indeed, we have some evidence that the market has matured since the 
first contract studied. This outcome is certainly consistent with priors that price discovery occurs 
on the market with the lower transaction costs. 
 
This conclusion concerning the relative efficiency of the futures can be extended along several 
dimensions. The CanPX data used in this study only covers a portion of trading in the secondary 
cash market. Future work will incorporate pricing information from the dealer-customer sector of 
the secondary market, so that the price discovery process can be simultaneously investigated 
across the futures market, the inter-dealer cash market, and the dealer-customer cash market. The 
focus of this study has been on quote prices. We intend in future work to look at transaction 
prices, as well as to incorporate quantity effects such as quote volumes and trade flows in the 
analysis in keeping with recent microstructure research in other markets. A third initiative 
involves a comparison with US data in which we ask whether the Canadian price discovery 
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Contract Maturity Daily Volume Traded Daily Number of Trades Daily Trade Size
CGB Spot CGB Spot CGB Spot
Contract 1: June 2002 5251 166 542 35 9.8 4.7
Contract 2: September 2002 4936 166 543 34 9.1 4.8
Contract 3: December 2002 5514 163 617 39 9 4.3
Contract 4: March 2003 5916 151 809 33 7.3 4.4
Contract 5: March 2004 6054 174 742 43 8.1 4.1
Contract 6: June 2004 8424 193 894 43 9 4.6
Contract 7: September 2004 7371 160 954 37 7.8 4.3
Trade size  and volume is in millions of dollars in the bond market and is the number of contracts in the CGB market where
each contract has a notional value of $100,000. The numbers in the Table are averages of daily averages.
Table 1: CGB and Ten-Year Bond Trading Statistics
February 26, 2002 - February 25, 2003
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Table 2: Percentage Quoted Half Spread
February 26, 2002 - February 25, 2003
November 27, 2003 - August 25, 2004
Contract Maturity
CGB Spot CGB Spot CGB Spot CGB Spot
Contract 1: June 2002 2.09 3.64 2.63 3.58 2.69 3.52 2.42 3.60
(0.55) (0.89) (0.78) (0.84) (1.26) (1.19) (0.60) (0.69)
Contract 2: September 2002 2.02 3.58 2.71 3.90 2.76 3.83 2.44 3.76
(0.54) (0.69) (0.74) (0.99) (1.07) (1.40) (0.54) (0.66)
Contract 3: December 2002 1.94 3.63 2.51 3.82 2.75 3.68 2.32 3.72
(0.46) (0.97) (0.55) (0.96) (1.43) (1.48) (0.44) (0.71)
Contract 4: March 2003 1.45 3.25 1.48 3.21 1.69 3.27 1.50 3.25
(0.53) (0.76) (0.56) (0.76) (0.85) (1.45) (0.53) (0.69)
Contract 5: March 2004 1.45 3.18 1.90 3.22 2.12 3.26 1.75 3.20
(0.35) (0.62) (0.54) (0.67) (1.06) (1.20) (0.43) (0.45)
Contract 6: June 2004 1.25 2.88 1.56 2.69 1.80 2.71 1.47 2.77
(0.29) (0.62) (0.41) (0.56) (0.64) (1.03) (0.29) (0.45)
Contract 7: September 2004 1.10 2.96 1.47 2.81 1.68 2.81 1.35 2.89
(0.29) (1.12) (0.37) (0.71) (0.92) (1.13) (0.34) (0.74)
Full Sample 1.60 3.30 2.02 3.31 2.20 3.29 1.88 3.30
(0.57) (0.87) (0.78) (0.90) (1.15) (1.33) (0.64) (0.73)
Spreads are in basis points. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3: Granger Causality and Error Correction
February 26, 2002 - February 25, 2003
November 27, 2003 - August 25, 2004
Contract Maturity Number of
Trading Days  F  ￿ C C  ￿ F F  ￿ C ecm F ecm C
Contract 1: June 2002 58 24 4 24 50 [1] 57 [8]
Contract 2: September 2002 56 35 1 12 41 [1] 56 [15]
Contract 3: December 2002 53 34 2 12 32 [0] 53 [21]
Contract 4: March 2003 56 37 1 12 31 [0] 56 [25]
Contract 5: March 2004 55 30 1 19 40 [0] 55 [15]
Contract 6: June 2004 60 33 0 21 43 [0] 60 [17]
Contract 7: September 2004 57 31 0 23 40 [0] 57 [17]
Totals 395 224 9 123 277 [1] 394 [118]
The numbers in each cell represent the number of trading days for the contract in question. The arrows  
indicate the direction of Granger causality using the charaterizaton due to Sims. The results reported 
under VECM indicate significance of the relevant t-test at the 5% level in equation (1). Numbers 
in [ ] indicate the number of days the coefficient was significant in the market indicated but
not in the other.
Granger Causality VECM
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Contract Maturity
Mean Median Q(.25) Q(.75) Std.Dev. Mean Median Q(.25) Q(.75) Std.Dev. Mean Median Q(.25) Q(.75)
C1: June 2002 OLS-day 0.59 0.58 0.50 0.70 0.163 0.63 0.68 0.51 0.78 0.210 0.72 0.77 0.62 0.85
OLS-opening 0.60 0.62 0.43 0.80 0.264 0.60 0.62 0.37 0.88 0.303 0.72 0.80 0.53 0.95
GARCH 0.52*** 0.53 0.40 0.65 0.196 0.39*** 0.26 0.09 0.67 0.344 0.84*** 0.95 0.85 0.99
C2: September 2002 OLS-day 0.69 0.68 0.59 0.78 0.152 0.73 0.74 0.60 0.86 0.168 0.83 0.84 0.76 0.92
OLS-opening 0.67 0.67 0.48 0.90 0.240 0.66** 0.72 0.41 0.93 0.281 0.78** 0.86 0.64 0.99
GARCH 0.63*** 0.62 0.51 0.74 0.179 0.43*** 0.37 0.17 0.67 0.239 0.86 0.97 0.84 1.00
C3: December 2002 OLS-day 0.72 0.74 0.62 0.83 0.169 0.76 0.81 0.63 0.90 0.189 0.85 0.90 0.80 0.96
OLS-opening 0.60*** 0.59 0.39 0.83 0.262 0.62*** 0.66 0.40 0.89 0.300 0.75*** 0.82 0.61 0.98
GARCH 0.61*** 0.61 0.44 0.77 0.218 0.44*** 0.45 0.11 0.71 0.275 0.86 0.99 0.90 1.00
C4: March 2003 OLS-day 0.72 0.70 0.61 0.83 0.145 0.75 0.77 0.67 0.88 0.166 0.85 0.85 0.75 0.97
OLS-opening 0.56*** 0.61 0.31 0.83 0.313 0.56*** 0.63 0.25 0.84 0.322 0.70*** 0.81 0.41 0.97
GARCH 0.62*** 0.60 0.48 0.72 0.175 0.55*** 0.60 0.26 0.79 0.237 0.92*** 0.99 0.93 1.00
C5: March 2004 OLS-day 0.73 0.74 0.64 0.80 0.139 0.76 0.78 0.69 0.85 0.140 0.86 0.88 0.82 0.94
OLS-opening 0.64*** 0.59 0.37 0.99 0.307 0.63*** 0.67 0.37 0.95 0.325 0.75*** 0.84 0.57 1.00
GARCH 0.61*** 0.62 0.49 0.73 0.213 0.48*** 0.51 0.21 0.74 0.260 0.91** 0.98 0.90 1.00
C6: June 2004 OLS-day 0.70 0.70 0.61 0.78 0.148 0.73 0.75 0.66 0.86 0.173 0.84 0.88 0.80 0.94
OLS-opening 0.69 0.74 0.47 0.96 0.280 0.67* 0.76 0.42 0.96 0.303 0.79** 0.90 0.66 1.00
GARCH 0.60*** 0.62 0.46 0.73 0.208 0.47*** 0.45 0.13 0.84 0.252 0.89** 0.98 0.92 1.00
C7: September 2004 OLS-day 0.67 0.68 0.55 0.79 0.197 0.68 0.74 0.53 0.84 0.213 0.80 0.84 0.72 0.93
OLS-opening 0.57*** 0.61 0.39 0.80 0.281 0.54*** 0.58 0.24 0.87 0.333 0.71** 0.84 0.49 0.95
GARCH 0.57*** 0.58 0.47 0.68 0.197 0.46*** 0.44 0.09 0.83 0.247 0.87** 0.99 0.88 1.00
Full Sample OLS-day 0.69 0.69 0.58 0.80 0.165 0.72 0.74 0.61 0.86 0.186 0.82 0.85 0.75 0.94
OLS-opening 0.62*** 0.63 0.41 0.84 0.281 0.61*** 0.66 0.35 0.90 0.311 0.74*** 0.84 0.59 0.98
GARCH 0.59*** 0.60 0.46 0.72 0.200 0.46*** 0.45 0.13 0.75 0.254 0.88*** 0.98 0.89 1.00
The numbers are averages of daily estimates over the contract. The Gonzalo-Granger numbers come from the estimation of equation (4). The Hasbrouck bounds are described in the text.The first row of each contract is 
estimated using OLS on the full day while the second row is estimated using OLS on only data from 8:20am to 9:00am. The third row of results are derived from a GARCH BEKK specification with a dummy to capture
an 8:30-8:40 intra-day seasonal effect. See the text for further details.
***, **, * denote significantly different from OLS-day results at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a pairwise t-test of means.











5% Mean 95% %Days>0.5 %Days<0.5 5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95% %Days>0.5 %Days<0.5
C1: June 2002 OLS-day 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.36 0.07 0.58 0.63 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.73 0.26 0.03
OLS-opening 0.53 0.60 0.62 0.17 0.05 0.51 0.60 0.61 0.64 0.72 0.74 0.09 0.02
GARCH n.a. 0.52 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.39 n.a. n.a. 0.84 n.a. n.a. n.a.
C2: September 2002 OLS-day 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.61 0.00 0.69 0.73 0.74 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.48 0.00
OLS-opening 0.59 0.67 0.68 0.31 0.02 0.57 0.66 0.67 0.70 0.78 0.79 0.15 0.00
GARCH n.a. 0.63 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.43 n.a. n.a. 0.86 n.a. n.a. n.a.
C3: December 2002 OLS-day 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.04 0.71 0.76 0.77 0.81 0.85 0.86 0.68 0.00
OLS-opening 0.54 0.60 0.62 0.21 0.06 0.53 0.62 0.63 0.67 0.75 0.76 0.09 0.02
GARCH n.a. 0.61 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.44 n.a. n.a. 0.86 n.a. n.a. n.a.
C4: March 2003 OLS-day 0.69 0.72 0.73 0.61 0.00 0.70 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.45 0.00
OLS-opening 0.49 0.56 0.58 0.20 0.15 0.47 0.56 0.57 0.62 0.70 0.72 0.07 0.02
GARCH n.a. 0.62 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.55 n.a. n.a. 0.92 n.a. n.a. n.a.
C5: March 2004 OLS-day 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.02 0.72 0.76 0.77 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.65 0.00
OLS-opening 0.56 0.64 0.64 0.31 0.06 0.54 0.63 0.64 0.67 0.75 0.77 0.22 0.00
GARCH n.a. 0.61 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.48 n.a. n.a. 0.91 n.a. n.a. n.a.
C6: June 2004 OLS-day 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.67 0.00 0.69 0.73 0.74 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.48 0.00
OLS-opening 0.60 0.69 0.68 0.31 0.05 0.58 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.79 0.80 0.19 0.00
GARCH n.a. 0.60 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.47 n.a. n.a. 0.89 n.a. n.a. n.a.
C7: September 2004 OLS-day 0.64 0.67 0.68 0.58 0.07 0.64 0.68 0.69 0.76 0.80 0.81 0.44 0.04
OLS-opening 0.51 0.57 0.60 0.13 0.13 0.47 0.54 0.57 0.64 0.71 0.74 0.07 0.00
GARCH n.a. 0.57 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.46 n.a. n.a. 0.87 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Full Sample OLS-day 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.61 0.03 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.49 0.01
OLS-opening 0.57 0.62 0.60 0.23 0.07 0.55 0.61 0.59 0.70 0.74 0.73 0.13 0.01
GARCH n.a. 0.59 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.46 n.a. n.a. 0.88 n.a. n.a. n.a.
The numbers are averages of daily estimates over the contract. The Gonzalo-Granger numbers come from the estimation of equation (4). The Hasbrouck bounds are described in the text.The first row of each contract is 
estimated using OLS on the full day while the second row is estimated using OLS on only data from 8:20am to 9:00am. The third row of results are derived from a GARCH BEKK specification with a dummy to capture
an 8:30-8:40 intra-day seasonal effect. See the text for further details.
% Days>0.5 is the percent of days within the contract period for which the GG or Hasbrouck lower bound information share was significantly greater than 0.5 at the 5% significance level. 
% Days<0.5 is the percent of days for which the GG or Hasbrouck upper bound was significantly less than 0.5.
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Table 6: Sum of Impulse Response Deviations
Contract Maturity
5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95% Spot>Futures Futures> Spot No Difference # of Days
C1: June 2002 OLS-day 0.037 0.041 0.044 0.056 0.063*** 0.066 0.24 0.07 0.69 58
OLS-opening 0.024 0.030 0.039 0.029 0.043** 0.048 0.24 0.07 0.69 58
GARCH n.a. 0.042 n.a. n.a. 0.065*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C2: September 2002 OLS-day 0.025 0.026 0.030 0.064 0.075*** 0.076 0.41 0.00 0.57 56
OLS-opening 0.022 0.029 0.039 0.031 0.051*** 0.053 0.38 0.00 0.58 52
GARCH n.a. 0.029 n.a. n.a. 0.080*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C3: December 2002 OLS-day 0.022 0.024 0.027 0.058 0.066*** 0.068 0.51 0.00 0.47 53
OLS-opening 0.022 0.028 0.034 0.028 0.038** 0.043 0.51 0.00 0.47 53
GARCH n.a. 0.025 n.a. n.a. 0.068*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C4: March 2003 OLS-day 0.021 0.022 0.026 0.054 0.065*** 0.068 0.32 0.02 0.64 56
OLS-opening 0.022 0.028 0.034 0.023 0.035 0.042 0.32 0.02 0.64 55
GARCH n.a. 0.022 n.a. n.a. 0.064*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C5: March 2004 OLS-day 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.046 0.050*** 0.052 0.53 0.00 0.45 55
OLS-opening 0.019 0.022 0.028 0.026 0.037*** 0.040 0.53 0.00 0.44 54
GARCH n.a. 0.019 n.a. n.a. 0.053*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C6: June 2004 OLS-day 0.020 0.022 0.025 0.046 0.051*** 0.053 0.39 0.00 0.60 60
OLS-opening 0.022 0.026 0.035 0.035 0.049*** 0.052 0.39 0.00 0.59 58
GARCH n.a. 0.025 n.a. n.a. 0.056*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C7: September 2004 OLS-day 0.023 0.026 0.029 0.043 0.050*** 0.052 0.33 0.05 0.60 57
OLS-opening 0.024 0.030 0.118 0.027 0.036 0.090 0.32 0.05 0.60 55
GARCH n.a. 0.029 n.a. n.a. 0.053*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Full Sample OLS-day 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.055 0.060*** 0.059 0.39 0.02 0.58 395
OLS-opening 0.025 0.028 0.047 0.032 0.041*** 0.050 0.38 0.02 0.57 385
GARCH n.a. 0.027 n.a. n.a. 0.063*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The numbers are averages of daily estimates over the contract. They represent the cumulative sum of the absolute deviation of the impulse response from its 
long run value. For each day, the results are average across all possible impulse responses: for each of two Choleski orderings there are four impulse responses 
representing each markets' response to each markets' shock. Each Choleski ordering is equally weighted while within each ordering, the impulses are weighted 
by the asympototic variance decomposition value.
***, **, * denotes spot and futures results significantly different at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a pairwise t-test of means.
The column Spot>Futures represents the percent of days for which the spot market result was significantly greater than the futures market at the 90% significance level.
Futures Market
% of Days of significant difference
Spot Market Comparison
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Table 7: Number of Minutes until Long-Run Equilibrium is Attained
Contract Maturity
5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95% 5% Mean 95% Spot>Futures Futures>Spot No Difference # of Days
C1: June 2002 OLS-day 7.72 8.86 9.11 10.35 11.75 11.65 1.66 2.88*** 3.53 0.28 0.07 0.66 58
OLS-morning 3.33 4.50 4.93 3.48 5.28 5.18 -0.76 0.78 1.11 0.28 0.07 0.66 58
GARCH n.a. 8.84 n.a. n.a. 11.76 n.a. n.a. 2.92*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C2: September 2002 OLS-day 5.00 5.65 6.18 9.26 10.43 10.45 3.43 4.78*** 5.12 0.50 0.00 0.50 56
OLS-morning 3.04 3.82 4.31 3.55 4.98 4.70 -0.33 1.17** 1.25 0.50 0.00 0.50 52
GARCH n.a. 5.65 n.a. n.a. 10.39 n.a. n.a. 4.74*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C3: December 2002 OLS-day 4.34 4.96 5.42 8.81 9.82 9.88 3.71 4.86*** 5.25 0.66 0.04 0.30 53
OLS-morning 3.05 4.34 4.43 3.46 4.60 4.76 -0.44 0.26 1.21 0.66 0.04 0.30 53
GARCH n.a. 4.97 n.a. n.a. 9.75 n.a. n.a. 4.78*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C4: March 2003 OLS-day 5.29 5.95 7.41 10.92 12.97 13.15 4.20 7.02*** 7.34 0.43 0.02 0.55 56
OLS-morning 3.61 4.82 5.88 3.41 5.07 5.20 -1.57 0.24 0.82 0.44 0.02 0.55 55
GARCH n.a. 5.87 n.a. n.a. 11.87 n.a. n.a. 6.00*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C5: March 2004 OLS-day 3.90 4.49 4.83 7.38 8.15 8.19 2.83 3.66*** 4.01 0.60 0.02 0.38 55
OLS-morning 2.81 3.57 3.90 3.13 4.50 4.32 -0.32 0.94** 1.06 0.61 0.02 0.37 54
GARCH n.a. 4.43 n.a. n.a. 8.12 n.a. n.a. 3.69*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C6: June 2004 OLS-day 5.06 5.91 6.30 8.59 9.75 9.84 2.74 3.84*** 4.32 0.50 0.00 0.50 60
OLS-morning 2.71 3.41 3.84 3.40 4.96 4.60 -0.01 1.56*** 1.48 0.52 0.00 0.48 58
GARCH n.a. 5.80 n.a. n.a. 9.69 n.a. n.a. 3.90*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C7: September 2004 OLS-day 5.22 5.93 6.43 8.83 10.05 10.04 2.76 4.12*** 4.46 0.42 0.05 0.53 57
OLS-morning 2.83 3.08 8.70 3.45 4.59 8.90 -1.11 1.51** 2.76 0.42 0.05 0.53 55
GARCH n.a. 5.85 n.a. n.a. 9.93 n.a. n.a. 4.08*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Full Sample OLS-day 5.62 5.99 6.14 9.54 10.43 10.06 3.56 4.44*** 4.29 0.48 0.03 0.49 395
OLS-morning 3.41 3.93 4.56 3.78 4.86 4.81 -0.10 0.93*** 0.84 0.49 0.03 0.49 385
GARCH n.a. 5.94 n.a. n.a. 10.23 n.a. n.a. 4.29*** n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The numbers are averages of daily estimates over the contract. They represent the average number of periods taken to come within 10% of the long-run asymptotic value for the impulse  
response. For each day, the results are average across all possible impulse responses: for each of two Choleski orderings there are four impulse responses 
representing each markets' response to each markets' shock. Each Choleski ordering is equally weighted while within each ordering, the impulses are weighted by the asympototic variance 
decomposition value.
***, **, * denotes spot and futures results significantly different at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a pairwise t-test of means.
The column Spot>Futures represents the percent of days for which the spot market result was significantly greater than the futures market at the 90% significance level.
Futures Market
% of Days of significant difference
Spot Market Difference Comparison
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Table 8: Regression Results using Futures Market Daily Information Shares
OLS-day OLS-day OLS-open OLS-open GARCH GARCH OLS-day OLS-day OLS-open OLS-open GARCH GARCH
Constant 0.401 1.121 0.386 0.725 0.293 0.796 0.543 1.052 0.453 0.695 0.671 1.100
(7.502)*** (11.098)*** (3.726)*** (3.656)*** (4.232)*** (6.087)*** (9.614)*** (9.962)*** (4.265)*** (3.416)*** (8.000)*** (7.015)***
FIRST3DAYS -0.159 -0.181 -0.136 -0.151 -0.064 -0.087 -0.169 -0.182 -0.120 -0.131 -0.107 -0.115
(-3.910)*** (-4.357)*** (-1.748)* (-1.953)* (-1.207) (-1.613) (-3.928)*** (-4.205)*** (-1.507) (-1.644) (-1.708)* (-1.840)*
CONTRACT #2-#7 0.091 0.098 0.036 0.035 0.081 0.084 0.101 0.099 0.041 0.029 0.038 0.050
(4.096)*** (4.439)*** (0.837) (0.858) (2.810)*** (2.971)*** (4.303)*** (4.310)*** (0.938) (0.680) (1.110) (1.477)
MEAN HALF SPREAD-F -0.048 0.012 -0.028 -0.041 0.011 -0.057
(-4.175)*** (0.534) (-1.881)* (-3.433)*** (0.480) (-3.007)***
MEAN HALF SPREAD-C 0.056 0.021 0.050 0.049 0.028 0.025
(5.706)*** (1.071) (3.928)*** (4.694)*** (1.438) (1.482)
NUMBER OF TRADES-F 0.006 0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.030
(0.645) (0.339) (0.111) (-0.318) (-0.182) (-1.928)*
NUMBER OF TRADES-C 0.038 0.026 0.037 0.025 0.017 0.042
(4.224)*** (1.470) (3.114)*** (2.560)*** (0.946) (3.005)***
RATIO SPREAD -0.910 -0.076 -0.431 -0.678 0.046 -0.746
(-5.610)*** (-0.240) (-2.054)** (-4.003)*** (0.144) (-2.935)***
RATIO TRADES -0.299 -0.208 -0.202 -0.181 -0.113 -0.344
(-3.588)*** (-1.254) (-1.877)* (-2.083)** (-0.666) (-2.692)***
RSQ 0.205 0.171 0.009 0.005 0.071 0.035 0.149 0.134 0.006 -0.001 0.038 0.034
NOBS 395 395 385 385 395 395 395 395 385 385 395 395
FIRST3DAYS is one for each of the first three days of a contract and zero otherwise. CONTRACT#2-#7  is one for Contract #2 to #7 and zero for Contract #1. 
MEAN HALF SPREAD-F(C) is the percentage quote half spread in the futures (cash) market. NUMBER OF TRADES-F (C) is the number of trades in the futures (cash) market.
RATIO SPREAD is the ratio of the percentage half spread in the futures market to the spread in the cash market. RATIO TRADES is the ratio of the number of trades in the futures and cash markets.
***, **, * spot and futures results significantly different at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a pairwise t-test of means.
Gonzalo-Granger Hasbrouck - Mid-Point
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Figure 1
CGB Price Discovery Shares By Contract-OLS Full Day
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Figure 2
CGB Price Discovery Shares By Contract - GG Measure







1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56







1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56







1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46 51 56




   37
Figure 3
CGB Price Discovery Shares By Contract
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Figure 4
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